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BOOK REVIEW
THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION. Harry W. Jones (ed.):
Prentice-Hall, Inc. [The American Assembly, Columbia University] 1965,
pp. v-viii, 1-177. $1.95
London. Michaelmas Term lately over, and the Lord Chancellor
sitting in Lincoln's Inn Hall. Implacable November weather ... mud
in the streets ... smoke .... Fog everywhere ... and the dense fog
is densest, and the muddy streets are the muddiest, near that leaden-
headed old corporation: Temple Bar. And bard by Temple Bar,
in Lincoln's Inn Hall, at the very heart of the fog, sits the Lord High
Chancellor in his High Court of Chancery.
Bleak House
Charles Dickens
Charles Dickens was cogently critical of the performance of Her Majesty's
court and Her Majesty's judges in the 19th century. William Shakespeare
("first, let's kill all the lawyers") was critical of the performance of Her
Majesty's courts and Her Majesty's judges in the 16th and 17th centuries.
There have been, and there will be, others critical of the performance of the
judiciary. Doubtless the 21st century will produce its share, although a
blithe skepticism impels one to the conviction that the 21st century's critics
will not approach the art or invention of a Dickens or a Shakespeare. Both
men are without peer as evocative critics of courts and lawyers "from without";
but neither man undertook to evaluate the workings of legal institutions "from
within." Both the Common Law and the Lord High Chancellor objectively
may have fallen short of the ideal, and may continue to do so. But criticism of
"Her Majesty's" courts and judges has, in the past, tended to ignore or over-
look the "from within" problems of court organization, court workloads, legal
procedures, political road-blocks, the varying competence of attorneys, the
psychological and other requirements of a trial judge, et al. This failure to
look beyond the faqade of judicial administration has not been a fault con-
fined to laymen: lawyers and judges themselves have probably known less
about the inner workings of their profession than have any other professionals
known about their own professions. Lawyers and judges simply have been "too
busy" to concern themselves with these problems in perspective. Rather,
they have been content with the comforting thought that, via their "expe-
rience," they have a "sense," a "feeling," an "instinct" about what is actually
happening within the legal profession on a day-to-day basis. Gradually,
and very recently, our gentle profession is beginning to indulge in serious
self-analysis and self-reexamination. Proposals for court reorganization, im-
provements in civil and criminal procedures, resurrection of the "art of ad-
vocacy," continuing legal and judicial education, selection and tenure of
judges, etc., all manifest a willingness within the legal profession to forego
operating on the basis of unconscious habit and custom. Instead, there appears
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to be a real desire within the legal profession to "know itself" and to re-assess
its public responsibilities. No doubt this development has been prompted in
part by the 20th-century advancement in certain arts, viz., psychology and
technology (data retrieval); but probably the prime impetus to analyzing the
administration of law "from within" has been the "law explosion" which is
being experienced in the mid-20th century. This book deals, in a threshold but
finely searching manner, with this subject. Stated simply, since the beginning
of the century, there are "twice as many people, therefore twice as many dis-
putes to be settled, twice as many civil claims to be heard and weighed, twice
as many criminal charges to be tried and determined. . . .New rights . . .
have been brought into being .... New social interests are pressing for recog-
nition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate have found legal spokesmen and
are asserting grievances long unheard."1
The book contains six separate essays, all of which are noteworthy, and
all of which are composed by honorable and highly capable men. No one
could wish for more sound discussions of such subjects as the business of trial
courts, 2 court congestion,3 appellate review,4 mass production in criminal cases,5
profile of the trial judge,6 and judicial selection and tenure. 7 After one ponders
the exquisite irony of the assembly-line treatment of the criminally accused as
juxtaposed with the snail-like disposition of civil claims; after one reflects upon
the realities of appellate disposition under a "free-appeal" rule as distinguished
from a "final decision" rule; and after one debates with oneself concerning
whether the "Missouri Plan" or some other "plan" is best for selecting judges,
it seems inevitable that one comes to grips with an ultimate reality: in more
than 90 percent of all cases, because they are not appealed for one reason or
another, the trial court is in truth "the court of last resort." Most often, there-
fore, it is in the trial court that final "justice" is done or undone. It is the trial
judge who does or "un-does" is.
The awesomeness of the responsibilities which are placed upon the trial
judge is intimately interwoven with the manner in which the trial judge is
selected, and necessarily one considers the question of "who is qualified" to be a
trial judge. In this regard, the essay in this book by Professor Jones8 on the
nature of the trial judge and his work probably does as much as any of these
essays in isolating and identifying the central problem which has resulted from
the "law explosion." This is a fine and definitive piece of work, and Professor
Jones is deserving of high commendation. He has looked at 20th century
American justice "from within."
1. P. 2.
2. Pp. 7-28, Milton D. Green.
3. Pp. 29-59, Maurice Rosenberg.
4. Pp. 60-84, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.
5. Pp. 85-123, Edward L. Barrett, Jr.
6. Pp. 124-45, Harry W. Jones.
7. Pp. 146-77, Glenn R. Winter and Robert E. Allard.
8. Pp. 124-45, "The Trial Judge-Role Analysis and Profile."
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In addition to being charged with utilizing production-line techniques in
disposing of criminal cases, trial judges are also accused of tolerating delay in
the disposition of civil cases. Respecting the matter of civil litigation, it may
be appropriate to analyze the trial judge's role from his point of view--"from
within." Most judges consider that the major factors contributing to delay in
civil litigation include the following: attorneys placing a great number of cases
on the calendar which they never intend shall be tried; the presence on the
calendar of cases which attorneys have over-valued and which should be brought
in courts of limited jurisdiction rather than in a court of general jurisdiction;
attorneys' failures to settle vintage cases which continue on the calendar long
after pre-trial preparations have been completed; attorneys' engagements in
other courts and trials; and attorneys' dilatory tactics, both as individuals and
in friendly concert with one another. Judges tend to feel that calendar delay,
for which the judges themselves appear to receive the majority of public blame,
in fact is almost exclusively the fault of attorneys, and often their clients. The
result is that judges feel obliged to spend a considerable amount of time and
energy arranging settlement conferences; screening out the small-claims cases;
urging attorneys to go to trial or seeking out attorneys who are ready for trial;
hearing cases after attorneys have consented to re-open default judgments; etc.
In short, trial judges find themselves performing an increasing mass of technical
house-cleaning chores which take valuable time more suitably devoted to hear-
ing and deciding the merits of lawsuits.
The publicity given to the sheer number of cases on a court calendar tends
to be deceptive, and trial judges feel that the ogre of delay in the courts has
been exaggerated and unfairly attributed to them. There is agreement that
80-90 percent of the cases appearing on the calendar will never reach trial, and
that only 3 percent will ever go to a verdict. Thus, judges consider that delay in
civil litigation becomes a serious matter only when counsel who are desirous of
and ready for trial are unable to have their cases tried within a reasonable num-
ber of months. Therefore, in order intelligently to deal with the problems both of
"delay" and of court re-organization, statistics on court performance should
probably reflect the true delay time actually attributable to judges themselves.
This would contrast with the theoretical statistical delay which is based upon
the raw number of cases appearing on a given court calendar.
It seems apparent that, to most judges, the attorneys who practice before
them have not kept abreast of the "law explosion." For example, a problem
which seems common to every judicial district is that caused by "engaged
counsel," whereby cases otherwise ready for trial must be continued solely
because the attorney for one side or the other is allegedly busy elsewhere. Such
attorneys are those whose eminence and popularity cause them to be retained
in a great number of cases. From the vantage point of judges, the trial bar is
felt to be far too small to handle adequately and effectively the mass intake
of cases in our courts. Thus there are urgings that it is in the best interests of
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the profession that law schools, the bench, the bar associations and the insur-
ance carriers do their utmost to encourage and train law students and young
lawyers to become litigation advocates in order to increase both the quantity
of trial lawyers and the quality of legal advocacy. Currently, materials for the
teaching of the "art of advocacy" are being prepared by a joint committee
composed of members of the Association of American Law Schools, the American
College of Trial Lawyers and the Section of Judicial Administration of the
American Bar Association.
It is not surprising that judges consider that their responsibility in the law
explosion begins and ends only where they have effective power. Admittedly,
judges have no power over the number and quality of cases placed on the
calendar, nor do they have power to solve the shortage of attorneys engaged
in litigation practice. Given the reluctance or disinterestedness of legislatures
(who often are given to shrinking judicial power rather than expanding it),
the trial judge in the "law explosion" must make do with such judicial power
as he has. Concededly, the trial judges have inherent power to control their
calendars as they find them-and this power includes the power to control the
attorneys and the parties. It is clear that some judges are more reluctant to
exercise this power than others, and some judges prefer not to exercise their
power without a formal rule of court. In general, given an intimate knowledge
of the attorneys who regularly practice before them, probably most judges
fulfill their "law explosion" responsibilities by negotiation and suggestion rather
than by actual use of the powers they admittedly have.
As stated by Lord Herschell in the 19th century, "Important as it is that
people should get justice, it is even more important that they be made to feel
and see that they are getting it." To accomplish this goal, a first step is to
improve the reality of justice in our trial courts. This is acknowledged through-
out this book; and the book itself should serve as a highly useful tool to chart
a course to meet the demands of contemporary life.
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